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ABSTRACT 
 
Religion is a cultural universal that has puzzled evolutionists since Darwin. The 
moral, social, emotional, and explanatory components that make up complex 
religious systems offer both evolutionary benefits and costs. Evolutionists who 
propose functional accounts of religion argue that it offers adaptive benefits that 
outweigh the costs. Theorists who propose nonfunctional accounts view religion as 
a byproduct of interactions among nonreligious cognitive adaptations and 
environments. Others argue that religion evolved via memetic transmission, which 
allows maladaptive features to persist. These maladaptive features may be 
anachronisms that were functional in the past but are detrimental to fitness in 
modern contexts. A thorough review reveals that work guided by these different 
perspectives is driven by divergent research questions that ultimately complement 
one another to offer a more comprehensive evolutionary account of the complexity, 
variety, and durability of religious belief and behavior. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the 1740s a small Protestant group known as the Shakers formed in 
Manchester, England. The Shaker creed emphasized equality between men and 
women in religious practices, the need for communal living, a literalist view of the 
Bible, and a strict moral code. Following their eventual migration to New England, 
the Shakers attracted nearly 20,000 converts throughout the nineteenth century 
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(Garrett, 1987). Yet by 2006, there were only four Shakers left (Chase, 2006). How 
did this happen? Evidently, the survival of the group was difficult to maintain 
because of one major pitfall: they believed that men, to atone for women’s original 
sin, should remain celibate for their entire lives, even in marriage. Thus, the group 
relied solely on conversion and adoption to maintain their ranks. This resulted in 
their eventual demise.  
 The story of the Shakers illustrates the power and complexity of religion. 
Their creed provided benefits to each individual and to the group by ensuring high 
levels of altruistic behavior within their communal living structure (Garrett, 1987). Yet 
these benefits came with the cost of extinguishing each individual’s direct genetic 
line, resulting in an evolutionary dead-end. Evolutionarily, the initial popularity of the 
Shaker movement is puzzling because each follower willingly endured a significant 
detriment to their genetic survival and reproductive success. How could natural 
selection result in a willingness to sacrifice one’s own reproductive fitness in the 
service of religion? Puzzles like this have challenged evolutionists since Darwin. 
Over the years, scientists have offered a variety of explanations to account for 
particular religious phenomena and to make sense of the universality, complexity, 
and variation among religions. Yet many questions remain unanswered. While one 
religion may directly promote within-group dynamics, another may be based on 
individual spiritual devotion devoid of group attachments. How did these very 
different manifestations of religion evolve? In the field of evolutionary religious 
studies, scholars examine possible underlying psychological mechanisms of 
religious belief and behavior, as well as their adaptive and maladaptive features, to 
seek scientific answers to these questions. 
Thus far, evolutionists have formed three theoretical camps that view religion 
as nonfunctional, functional, or dysfunctional. Nonfunctional theorists hypothesize 
that religion is not an adaptation but instead an evolutionary byproduct of 
nonreligious adaptations. Functional theorists hypothesize that religion’s benefits 
outweigh its costs in terms of survival and reproductive success. Work by such 
theorists focuses on identifying specific religious adaptations that serve particular 
functions. Dysfunctional theorists hypothesize that religious phenomena, particularly 
their maladaptive features, result from cultural evolutionary processes that are 
relatively independent of individual and group fitness. The three approaches also 
tend to differ in their favored level of analysis. Nonfunctional accounts tend to 
emphasize the role of genetics and the development of the brain in generating the 
various components of religious systems. Functional accounts tend to emphasize 
social and cultural influences on behavior with an explicit focus on religion’s group-
level features. Dysfunctional accounts tend to emphasize the role of cultural 
transmission and rapid environmental changes in preserving costly aspects of 
religion. 
At first glance these perspectives appear incompatible. A thorough review, 
however, reveals that these theorists address divergent yet complementary 
research questions. Nonfunctionalists ask: What are the evolutionary origins of the 
religion’s cognitive components? Functionalists ask: What adaptive functions does 
religion serve and how did it evolve to serve these functions? Dysfunctional theorists 
ask: How are religious concepts transmitted and maintained, and why do 
maladaptive features persist? Research and theory driven by different questions has 
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inspired divergent approaches and resulted in dissimilar conclusions. However, 
what appear at first to be incompatible results are actually more complementary 
than they seem. The review presented here is guided by the conviction that religion 
poses a set of evolutionary puzzles rather than a single puzzle to which different 
camps have offered contradictory solutions. By showing how the different 
perspectives complement one another, this article aims to sidestep the usual 
disputes and instead advance one step along the path to a more integrated, 
comprehensive evolutionary account.  
 
Defining Religion 
 
 Perhaps because of the tendency to focus on one question rather than on a 
suite of questions, evolutionists have often used definitions of religion that fail to 
capture religion’s complexity and encompass all of its possible forms and variations.  
To support a more comprehensive analysis, we define religion broadly as a set of 
myths, symbols, beliefs, and practices, of a supernatural quality, expressed and 
maintained by an individual or group and consisting of four often inter-related 
components: (1) morality, (2) social cohesion, (3) emotion, and (4) explanation.1 
Relative emphasis on the four major components varies across religions. So far, 
evolutionary theories of religion have also varied in their relative emphasis on these 
components. Religions can provide individuals and groups with systems for moral 
foundation and structure; social order, consistency, and cohesion; emotional 
comfort; and explanations for life’s origins, harsh realities, puzzling natural 
phenomena, and an afterlife. The evidence, however, suggests that religious 
systems can be both beneficial and costly to individual and group fitness.2 
 
The Evolutionary Theories of Religion 
 
This multifaceted definition attests to the immense complexity of religion. As 
noted above, nonfunctional, functional, and dysfunctional approaches differ based 
on the three types of research questions they pose. Some of these perspectives 
have also generated different branches of theorizing, resulting in five competing 
evolutionary theories of religion. The nonfunctionalist perspective has generated 
byproduct theory. Byproduct theory posits that religion originates from psychological 
mechanisms that were nonreligious adaptations to evolutionary problems of our 
ancestral environment. The functionalist perspective has generated two theories: 
individual-level adaptation theory and multi-level selection theory. These theories 
posit that religion is adaptive at the individual and group level, respectively. The 
                                                
1 The first two components are more often group-level features while the latter two are more 
often on the individual level. The numbering does not represent any priority among these 
components. 
2 It is important to note that evolutionary ‘success’ is a context-dependent measure. What is 
costly to individual or group fitness in one context, may be beneficial in another, and vice-
versa. Religions and the contexts in which they exist vary greatly. And, of course, the degree 
to which any religion is beneficial for any particular individual may be unrelated to 
“reproductive fitness” as defined by evolutionary logic. 
Evolutionary Perspectives on Religion 
 
 
EvoS Journal: The Journal of the Evolutionary Studies Consortium 
ISSN: 1944-1932 -  http://evostudies.org/journal.html   
2010, Volume 2(2), pp. 48-66.                                                                                                           -51- 
 
 
dysfunctional perspective has also generated two theories: a memetic theory of 
religion and anachronism theory. Meme theorists propose that religion culturally 
evolves through a process of memetic transmission and retention, resulting in the 
production and persistence of its maladaptive features. Anachronism theorists, on 
the other hand, hypothesize that religion’s maladaptive effects stem from significant 
changes to the human social environment in recent history that have rendered 
initially functional religious components dysfunctional.   
Proponents of the five theories often argue against each other. Much less 
attention has been paid to the interesting ways these theories complement one 
another. An integrated perspective that synthesizes these theories can help us 
circumvent past arguments over religion’s functionality and assemble a more 
comprehensive evolutionary account. In the review below, each theory is described 
in turn, with an emphasis on the features that make it distinctive. The paper 
concludes with suggestions of how the five theories might be integrated into a single 
overarching framework. 
 
Byproduct Theory 
 
Many evolutionists hypothesize that religious thought is a byproduct of the 
normal function of nonreligious psychological mechanisms that evolved in ancestral 
contexts. Supporters of byproduct theory propose that these nonreligious adaptive 
mechanisms are responsible for religion’s incidental existence and generate the 
illusion of its ostensible design. This theory helps explain religion’s universality and 
cross-cultural similarity by outlining its cognitive foundation in adaptations such as 
theory of mind and other features of social intelligence. It also provides a viable 
explanation for the evolutionary origins of religious thought.  
According to byproduct theorists, one cognitive adaptation that plays a key 
role in generating religious cognition is theory of mind, the human propensity to 
attribute mental states such as beliefs and intentions to others. Theory of mind 
allows humans to understand that the mental states of others can be different from 
their own. This provides the foundation for skills critical to social functioning, 
specifically in identifying cooperators, defectors, and cheaters in human social 
groups. Some scientists believe that the capacities that comprise social intelligence, 
including perspective taking and the ability to manipulate others, probably set off an 
evolutionary arms race between cooperative, defective, and cheating dispositions 
(Orbell, Morikawa, Hartwig, Hanley, & Allen, 2004). This naturally led to the 
development of the cooperative behaviors, ethical instincts, and moral systems that 
humans exhibit today. 
Theory of mind and social intelligence also gave humans a new perspective 
on self and other. In particular, other is redefined to potentially include anything that 
can be assigned agency (e.g. family members, friends, enemies, the deceased, 
supernatural entities, etc.). One cognitive device critical to this process is a 
hyperactive agency detection mechanism. This mechanism interprets unusual or 
ambiguous stimuli from our surrounding environment as signs of agency. This often 
makes us perceive human-like characteristics in nonliving objects. This originally 
nonreligious mechanism would have been a valuable asset in avoiding predators, 
especially other hostile humans. Anthropologists such as Stewart Guthrie (1995) 
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point to this systematic anthropomorphization of our environment (i.e. mistaking a 
shadow for an intentional spirit, seeing faces in the clouds, etc.) as the origins of 
supernaturalism and religious ideation. When coupled with a theory of mind, which 
readily assigns mental states and intentionality to these anthropomorphized objects, 
the resulting system incidentally generates thoughts of religious spirits and deities. 
Once humans developed these mechanisms, interactions among the mechanisms 
were inevitable, and the belief in the existence of immaterial, unverifiable, and 
supernatural entities with their own minds and intentions was a short cognitive step 
away.  
Religion’s complexity, however, indicates that a multitude of other 
mechanisms are also involved in generating religious cognition. As outlined by some 
cognitive anthropologists (Atran, 2002; Boyer, 2001, 2003; Boyer & Bergstrom, 
2008), these mechanisms probably number in the hundreds. Byproduct theory 
proposes that modern humans are predisposed to think religiously because of 
interactions between these nonreligious cognitive adaptations and environments. 
Psychologist Lee Kirkpatrick (1999) organizes them into larger categories, including 
naïve physics and folk-biology, naïve psychology and theory of mind, intra-sexual 
competition, kin selection and nepotism, reciprocity and social exchange, 
attachment, and intergroup bias and coalitional psychology. All of the nonreligious 
mechanisms in these categories have been identified as serving critical adaptive 
functions in the evolutionary past.  
From a research standpoint, byproduct theory offers an effective method for 
cognitively analyzing religious phenomena. In general, byproduct hypotheses 
require the identification of the byproduct’s underlying adaptations and the reason 
for its coupling with those adaptations (Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, & 
Wakefield, 1998; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). The byproduct theory of religion 
focuses on psychological mechanisms that can be empirically examined in 
laboratory settings. Scientists can form testable hypotheses regarding specific 
cognitive, behavioral, and cultural tendencies based on these adaptive mechanisms 
which have been theoretically explained using evolutionary theory (Kirkpatrick, 
1999). Psychologists Jesse Bering and Lee Kirkpatrick both empirically explore the 
nature of religious belief using this approach. Bering (2005, 2006) focuses on the 
complex development of afterlife beliefs resulting from interactions among 
mechanisms for causal attribution, moral judgment, theory of mind, concept 
acquisition, and teleological reasoning. Kirkpatrick (2005) investigates the role of an 
attachment mechanism in generating person-God relationships.  
Boyer (2001) also notes how this theory is capable of reversing many 
assumptions made by functionalists by reducing religion to its cognitive 
components. For instance, theologians and sociologists have often argued that 
religion’s function is to provide the moral basis to our decision making. However, the 
evidence suggests that humans have an innate moral system (see Hauser, Young, 
& Cushman, 2008) and that religious systems based on this foundation are a 
byproduct of these moral and ethical faculties interacting with other social 
mechanisms. Thus, morality is a predictable component of religious systems 
because of these underlying mechanisms. Similarly, rather than exist as an 
adaptation to enforce social order or promote group cohesion, religion is partially a 
byproduct of innate mechanisms that drive us to form coalitions and groups as well 
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as organize and categorize other people. Clearly, byproduct explanations turn these 
functional assumptions upside-down. 
Many scientists, however, have pointed out that this theory may 
overemphasize the role of genetics and the development of the brain (e.g. Wilson, 
2002). Thus, byproduct theory fails to answer critical evolutionary questions. For 
example, culture is an influential aspect of modern human environments and in 
reality genetics and culture influence the production, acquisition, and maintenance 
of religious concepts. So, how do religious systems, as innately social phenomena 
entailing individual and group-level components, change when we factor in these 
cultural influences? Although byproduct theory offers an effective cognitive 
approach, it fails to adequately address this question because it does not attend to 
religion’s social and cultural evolution.  Fortunately, this oversight is rectified by 
functional theories that more effectively address social and cultural processes in 
explaining how religious traditions and institutions change over time. We turn next to 
the functionalist theories, starting with individual-level adaptation theory. 
 
Individual-level Adaptation Theory 
 
Supporters of this theory hypothesize that religiousness enhanced the 
fitness of individual ancestors and still enhances individual fitness today. In their 
attempt to answer questions regarding religion’s ostensible functionality, many 
proponents of this theory have stressed religion’s role in promoting cooperation and 
altruism, traits that have been shown to be individually adaptive by Hamilton’s kin-
selection equation and Trivers’ reciprocal altruism theory (Hamilton, 1964; Trivers, 
1971). Individual-level theorists often argue that religion was specifically an 
adaptation to increase cooperative and altruistic behavior between non-kin. 
Essentially, individuals displaying higher levels of religiousness gain the benefits of 
reciprocal support from other religious individuals (Dennett, 2006). If these benefits 
were significant enough, and the fitness costs associated with religiousness were 
low enough, then selection pressures would have favored religiousness. According 
to these theorists, evidence that the majority of individuals alive today are religious, 
or at least self-identify as religious, supports this hypothesis. Recently, several 
research programs have arisen that are seeking empirical support for this theory. 
Individual-level adaptation theory helps highlight potential selective pressures that 
may have contributed to religion’s social and cultural evolution. This helps address 
questions left unanswered by byproduct theory. 
This functional approach can be taken in many different directions. Many 
religious theorists examine specific aspects of religion and subject them to a 
functional analysis. For example, anthropologist Richard Sosis (2004) developed a 
costly signaling theory of religious rituals based on studying many different religious 
groups, including Jewish kibbutzim in Israel.  Sosis proposes that religious rituals 
often effectively display an individual’s religious devotion and fitness, which 
increases his or her within-group status and reproductive opportunities. Likewise, 
this behavior can indirectly provide individual benefits to everyone in the group, as 
group solidarity tends to increase with higher levels of costly signaling behavior. 
Using this type of functional analysis, particular religious traditions and institutions 
can be examined from an individual-level perspective.  
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Jainism, a tradition that emerged in India around the same time as 
Buddhism, can serve as an example. Traditionally, Jains have occupied a 
distinguished position within the Indian economy as successful jewel traders. The 
ascetic values of Jainism are incredibly strict. The most devoted followers, called 
renouncers, often wear masks to filter the air they breathe, have extremely strict 
diets, are homeless, and travel completely naked. “Some even accomplish the 
ultimate ascetic act of fasting themselves to death” (Wilson, 2005, p. 436). However, 
Jain renouncers “constitute a tiny fraction of the Jain religion.” In reality, most lay 
Jains are impressively wealthy and follow a different set of doctrinally approved and 
more functional behaviors (p. 440). Fasting rituals are important aspects of their 
community, yet a lay Jain would rarely die as a result. Wilson notes that “fasting in 
young women demonstrates mastery over their appetites and increases their 
marriage prospects,” while “men compete for the privilege of supporting community 
activities.” Essentially, “the more extreme these demonstrations of religious 
devotion, the more they are publicized and raise the status of the family” (p. 438). 
Increased marriage prospects and higher family status would most likely entail a 
boost to individual reproductive success within this community. This example 
illustrates one of many modern manifestations of religion’s individual-level 
functionality. 
According to individual-level theorists, the beneficial effects of religiousness 
have been documented elsewhere as well. Recent studies have outlined 
correlations between religiousness and higher happiness, sociability, community 
involvement, lower anxiety, less emotional distress, and generally enhanced 
individual health (Jacobs-Pilipski, Winzelberg, Wilfley, Bryson, & Taylor, 2005; King, 
Welch, Nazroo, Blizard, & the EMPIRIC team, 2006; Kirby, Coleman, & Daley, 2004; 
Maselko & Kubzansky, 2006; Saroglou, Pichon, Trompette, Verschueren, & 
Dernelle, 2005; Wink & Scott, 2005). Some scholars question the efficacy of this 
correlational research when applied to evolutionary theorization (e.g. Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1990), as current correlations with fitness do not necessarily reveal 
longer term, past selective pressures. Instead (according to this critique) the 
appropriate role for evolutionary explanations is to explain why a feature exists in 
the first place (Buss, et al., 1998, p. 540; Symons, 1992; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990).  
According to individual-level theorists, these correlational data do reflect 
religion’s function and do reveal past selective pressures. They believe the dispute 
will be resolved in the near future through an expansion of more evolutionarily 
based research programs such as the interdisciplinary Evolution of Religion project 
(2009). The researchers in this program are collaborating to experimentally test the 
hypothesis that religious beliefs and behaviors offer effective solutions to important 
evolutionary problems and confer adaptive advantage to the individuals involved.  
Although often seen as incompatible, the functional approach can also be 
viewed as supplementing byproduct theory. Essentially, even though religion has 
functionality, it need not be an adaptation per se. Byproduct theory effectively 
addresses religion’s evolutionary and cognitive origins. The functional approach can 
provide insight into how byproducts that were originally generated by the interaction 
of nonreligious adaptations may be co-opted to serve new adaptive functions, even 
if they were initially nonfunctional. The next theory we address adds another layer of 
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complexity to this model, addressing questions regarding religion’s potential 
functionality “for the good of group” (Wilson & Wilson, 2008). 
 
Multi-level Selection Theory (MLST) 
 
In their quest to answer questions regarding religion’s functional purpose, 
multi-level selection theorists, led by David Sloan Wilson (2002, 2005, 2007), 
hypothesize that religion is primarily a group-level adaptation that promotes social 
cooperation and cohesion and thereby benefits social groups in comparison to other 
less cooperative social groups. In fact, many past attempts to support individual-
level adaptation theory can be viewed as supporting group-level adaptations 
(Wilson, 2002, 2005). For instance, individual-level researchers in the Evolution of 
Religion project (2009) have, in the past, attempted to address religion’s group-level 
components from an individual-level perspective. Their findings have generally 
supported the hypothesis that religion is adaptive at the group level by helping 
groups in “overcoming collective action problems, promoting cooperation, 
suppressing within-group conflict, and surviving inter-group competition” (para. 2). 
Religion, by definition, entails group-level components, making it an inherently social 
phenomenon. In many cases, this social phenomenon appears to serve group-level 
functions. MLST offers a viable explanation for how this group-level functionality can 
emerge when selection between groups based on group-benefiting social and 
cultural features outweighs individual-level selection within groups. 
Multi-level theorists conceptualize human groups such as religious 
congregations as group organisms that function in competition with other group 
organisms. When applied to religion, MLST posits that selection can take place at 
the individual and group level because cultural evolution operates differently than 
genetic evolution in human groups. Cultural information can quickly and easily 
infiltrate an entire group organism relative to genetic mutations. Indeed, this theory 
places heavy emphasis on the power of learning, development, and culture in 
influencing human behavior. When included in this field’s theoretical integration, 
MLST helps illuminate the group-level selective pressures partially responsible for 
religion’s co-opted functionality. 
In Darwin’s Cathedral: Evolution, Religion, and the Nature of Society (2002), 
Wilson uses several extended examples to argue that religion specifically functions 
to unify social groups and solve problems encountered at the group level. He sees 
Calvinism, for example, as a group-level reaction to perceived injustices of the 
Catholic Church and the resulting civil unrest in sixteenth-century Geneva. The 
Calvinist Church successfully resolved some of the problems specific to that 
environment. A system of checks and balances among the clergy, a strong belief in 
predetermination, and a belief in a personal relationship with God for each follower 
helped eliminate corruption, comfort the lower classes, and rebuild the social order 
that had dissolved under Catholic rule. From this perspective, religious systems 
socially evolve on short timescales via between-group competition. Systems that 
effectively display secular utility, that address and resolve group-level conflicts, and 
that promote individual and group fitness are thus socially selected and retained 
until inevitable environmental changes provoke another social movement.  
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Wilson (2002) argues that cultural factors have greatly altered humans’ 
evolutionary landscape, making group-level selection more feasible in explaining 
complex social phenomena. Although many evolutionary biologists reject the idea of 
group selection based on logical errors in the original formulation by Wynne-
Edwards (1962), the new conception embedded in MLST deserves a thorough 
reexamination given new developments in the evolutionary sciences (Wilson & 
Wilson, 2008; see also Pigliucci, 2009). In fact, MLST has applications in biological 
evolutionary processes as well as cultural ones, as exemplified by Herron and 
Michod’s (2008) analysis of the evolution of single celled organisms into multicellular 
algae colonies.  
According to Wilson, religious systems function at a higher level than other 
socially unifying features of culture in producing prominent beliefs in sacred things. 
He recognizes supernaturalism and beliefs in ‘the sacred’ as natural supportive 
forces that developed to better implement moral order and group solidarity. For this 
purpose, Wilson (2005) expounds an idea of individual-level proximate mechanisms. 
He argues that these mechanisms ultimately motivate adaptive behaviors for the 
group. For instance, individual meditative practices elicit group-level benefits by 
building cooperative dispositions within practitioners despite their emphasis on 
introspection and mental isolation. Wilson argues that these practices, and the 
religions that support them, require a functionalist approach because they exhibit 
clear adaptive benefits for groups. In fact, he asserts that all otherworldly beliefs 
motivate practical behaviors that provide these benefits. One detailed example he 
provides is Jainism.  
Wilson (2005) believes that a functional analysis of Jainism supports this 
group-level hypothesis. As touched on before, Jain rituals among lay followers 
provide individual fitness enhancements. However, the institution of Jainism also 
has features specifically designed for group-level functions, such as enforcement 
mechanisms that maintain the system of inequity between Jain renouncers and the 
Jain laity as well as between the in-group and the out-group. In addition, Jain rituals, 
which display the intense spiritual devotion of group members, increase group 
solidarity. Moral standards within the group are paramount and members of the out-
group receive differential treatment, further reinforcing group unity. Jainism appears 
to provide individual and group-level benefits to its lay followers, while many of its 
dogmatic prescriptions are particularly functional for the group as a whole. Thus, 
Wilson argues that this example provides support for MLST.  
Many evolutionists have criticized this approach as disregarding religion’s 
individual-level components and cognitive foundations. Boyer (2001) argues that the 
need for social cohesion and morality cannot be isolated as the root cause of 
religiousness or the creation of institutions. Rather, anthropologists and 
psychologists have discovered that, by nature, humans are social creatures with 
social intelligence. The study of this more fundamental social mind can “show us 
why people have particular expectations about social life and morality and how 
these expectations are connected to their supernatural concepts” (p. 27). Other 
nonfunctionalists view Wilson’s theory as “mind-blind” (Atran, 2002) as it ignores the 
possibility that religious tendencies can be reduced to more fundamental, naturally 
selected social cognitive mechanisms.  
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These criticisms of the MLST approach to religion are less problematic if 
MSLT is seen as supplemental to the nonfunctional account. Essentially, MLST 
adds another layer of complexity by effectively addressing questions concerning 
religion’s apparent functional design. From a broader, more integrated perspective, 
nonfunctional and functional accounts can be viewed as complementing one 
another to form a more comprehensive account that addresses both the 
evolutionary and cognitive origins of religion and the selective pressures that have 
shaped religion’s apparent functionality. The final step in this integration 
incorporates concepts from the dysfunctional perspective, which addresses those 
features and effects of religion (such as the celibacy requirement of Shakerism) that 
are maladaptive.   
 
Meme Theory 
 
Meme theory explains both the rapid transmission of religious concepts and 
the persistence of maladaptive religious features. A meme is an “element of culture 
that may be considered to be passed on by non-genetic means, especially imitation” 
(Atran, 2001, p. 3). In The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins (1976) used a gene-
meme analogy to help explain the evolution of cultural phenomena problematic to 
selfish gene theory. This analogy not only shows similarities between genes and 
memes but also outlines key differences. While the selfish gene perspective views 
bodies as the vehicles for genes, the memetic perspective views minds as the 
vehicles for memes (Atran, 2001). Memes can survive and replicate vertically and 
horizontally in a lineage. For example, the religious ritual of circumcision travels 
vertically from parent to child but memes can also travel horizontally from an 
unrelated individual to another via the dissemination of ideas. Memes are “selfish,” 
just like genes or parasites: they need not confer any benefits to their hosts. Meme 
theory conceptualizes one potential system of cultural transmission underlying the 
fast propagation of religious concepts, and also helps explain how and why 
maladaptive features of religion can persist despite evolutionary costs to individual 
and group fitness.  
A reexamination of Jainism can help clarify these ideas. Meme theorists 
interpret Jainism as a memeplex (i.e. a group of memes or meme complex) that 
entails specific dogmatic prescriptions. In extreme cases, the memeplex might kill a 
devout follower (a Jain renouncer). Yet Jainism can replicate horizontally via the 
spread of interest in Jainism even if some followers die. Among the Jain laity, 
followers who have a less “virulent” devotion to the sect can pass on this memeplex 
vertically from generation to generation within their tight community and horizontally 
to new members or converts. Although Jainism may seem to be based on irrational 
concepts and behaviors, its followers receive benefits such as economic security 
and a supportive community. They may also endure costs as the Jain community 
remains a small minority in India, which limits reproduction opportunities for 
followers. The costs are worst for the most devout members, the renouncers. 
According to meme theory, Jainism, as a memeplex, competes with other memes 
and memeplexes for survival. As long as it does not directly kill most of its “hosts” 
before it is transmitted, it will survive. The beneficial aspects of Jainism help this 
memeplex “fit” within the minds of group members. Its costly aspects persist 
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because it is designed via a memetic evolutionary process that is relatively 
independent of individual and group fitness.  
Of course, memes are not autonomous agents per se. The language used 
simply helps illuminate the argument. Some theorists (e.g. Dawkins, 2006) appear 
to believe that many or most religious memeplexes entail an ultimate evolutionary 
cost. However, memes and memeplexes can also be neutral or beneficial for their 
host. For example, early Christians vowed to care for sick members of the in-group 
during the plague. This commitment helped ensure the survival of both Christians 
and the Christian faith (the memeplex) in a hostile environment. Some meme 
theorists have offered an interpretation of religious memes that accommodates this 
sort of mutually beneficial result. 
Daniel Dennett (2006), for example, distinguishes between wild memes and 
domesticated memes, and uses the analogy of the dairy cow to illustrate the latter. 
Reliance on humans has been functional for the dairy cow, ensuring its survival and 
reproductive success. Its human stewards, for their part, have artificially selected 
dairy cows to serve their human caretakers. Religious memes, Dennett argues, 
evolved in this manner. Wild memes, or the religious thoughts and concepts of folk 
religions, originate within the confines of our cognitive structure and then evolve 
based on their relative success at being transmitted both vertically and horizontally. 
As these wild memes become domesticated, they are shaped and designed by 
humans to provide benefits for individuals and groups.  
Psychologist Donald Campbell (1975) offered a somewhat less cynical 
account. He argued that religious traditions often promote beneficial cognition and 
behavior. Campbell stressed that religious systems culturally evolve via between-
meme competition.3 Religious memes that infiltrate groups compete, and the 
traditions that have the best chances of survival within human cultures are those 
that are functional for their followers. From this perspective, the most successful 
memeplexes live in harmony with their hosts, providing benefits for followers.  
Memetics in general has remained largely theoretical, and has yet to garner 
much empirical support (Aunger, 2000, 2002). Some scientists have called it 
“pseudoscientific dogma” (Benitez-Bribiesca, 2001, p. 29). Others view it as a 
valuable framework to help conceptualize cultural information, but note a lack of 
evidence for treating these units as replicators (Atran, 1998). These criticisms need 
to be addressed if memetics is to progress as a scientific field. Aunger (2000) 
suggests that the meme may occupy a metaphorical position similar to that of 
Darwin’s original units of inheritance in the nineteenth century or genes in the 
twentieth century, before these units were empirically discovered. Meme theory’s 
primary conceptual utility may be as an impetus to continue grappling with the 
challenges of studying cultural evolution and transmission. Although the conceptions 
of memes and memeplexes as either cultural parasites or domesticated tools of 
social engineering may ultimately prove to be unsatisfactory, meme theorists have 
highlighted critical research questions about religion’s cultural transmission and 
                                                
3 ‘Meme’ as noted before is Dawkins’s term. Campbell developed his theory around the 
same time that Dawkins wrote The Selfish Gene, and would not have used this specific 
word. For the purposes of this discussion, however, it is conceptually useful for Campbell’s 
argument. 
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persistence and developed a conceptualization of culture that can help explain both 
adaptive and maladaptive religious phenomena. These are useful conceptual tools 
that more complex evolutionary models of religion can incorporate into their toolbox. 
 
Anachronism Theory 
 
Anachronism theorists, who focus on religion’s modern dysfunctionality, 
have pointed out a fascinating phenomenon: on short historical timescales, 
environmental and social changes can dramatically alter the utility of religious 
beliefs, behaviors, practices, and traditions. In essence, what was beneficial about a 
particular feature of religion yesterday may be costly today, and vice-versa. The 
disparity between ancestral and modern contexts (see Badcock, 2000; De Waal, 
2002) plays a key role in this approach to evolutionary theory. Essentially, 
adaptations to ancestral environments do not necessarily have the same effects on 
fitness in novel environments. Examples of this phenomenon include the human 
sweet tooth. Humans living in hunter-gatherer tribes when food was scarce 
developed a significant, instinctual desire for high-caloric foods. Unfortunately, this 
ancestral adaptation has led to maladaptive behavior in modern fast-food 
environments (Buss, et al., 1998; Wilson & Green, 2007). Similarly, religion can be 
viewed as an ancestral adaptation that has become modernly maladaptive, making 
it an evolutionary anachronism. Like memetics, anachronism theory adds to our 
understanding of the cultural evolution of religious systems and explains how 
religion can become dysfunctional.  
For example, some cultural psychologists have proposed that religion is an 
anachronism based on a human propensity for warfare (Kitayama & Cohen, 2007). 
This war hypothesis posits that religion was adaptive in an environment defined by 
between-group conflict. Recent evidence has shown that inter-group conflict could 
have played a critical role in human evolution (Keeley, 1997; LeBlanc 1999). 
Although mostly theoretical at this point, the war hypothesis highlights the critical 
role that short-timescale environmental changes, such as the shift from tribal 
societies to massive technologically advanced nations, can play in determining 
religion’s beneficial or costly impact on individual and group fitness. 
As already noted, studies have also found correlations between 
religiousness and psychological well-being and physical health (e.g. Kirby, Coleman 
& Daley, 2004; Maselko & Kubzansky, 2006). Some theorists argue that these 
benefits would have increased individual survival and reproductive success in 
ancestral contexts by reducing anxiety and distress, promoting cooperative 
behavior, increasing group solidarity, and increasing success during group conflicts 
(Kitayama & Cohen, 2007).  
 As evidence for a rapid change in functionality, anachronism theorists offer 
many examples of currently dysfunctional religious traditions. For instance, in an 
environment without modern food preservation technology, but with growing 
populations and expansive trade networks, certain foods become dangerous 
carriers of disease. Under these historical conditions, many religions developed 
doctrinal prescriptions to avoid certain foods (e.g. pork). Boyer & Bergstrom (2008) 
note that certain cognitive capacities define the way “religious institutions are built, 
work, and perpetuate themselves” (p. 123). In this case, fears of contagion and 
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pathogen avoidance mechanisms guided doctrinal modifications that were instigated 
by selective pressures in the social and cultural evolutionary process. Many food 
avoidance traditions that are still maintained are anachronistic and unnecessary 
given modern preservation techniques and could be maladaptive in food scarce 
environments.  
 In this way, aspects of anachronism theory can add some additional 
complexity to evolutionary models of religion by building on concepts of religion’s 
dysfunctionality. In sum, the dysfunctional perspective, including meme and 
anachronism theory, helps answer questions left unanswered by nonfunctional and 
functional theorists. They effectively address how religious phenomena are socially 
and culturally transmitted and how maladaptive features of religion may arise and 
persist despite their dysfunction. While meme theory explains religion’s dysfunction 
in terms of between-meme competition that is relatively independent of individual 
and group fitness, anachronism theory highlights how short-timescale environmental 
changes can render initially adaptive features maladaptive. By incorporating aspects 
of each theory into a complex evolutionary model, evolutionists can enrich their 
ability to address multiple research questions using a broadened perspective. We 
close the paper by briefly sketching out what a more integrated model might look 
like. 
 
THE INTEGRATED MODEL 
 
An integrated synthesis of nonfunctional, functional, and dysfunctional 
perspectives on religion would be beneficial for several interrelated reasons. First, 
they address different questions regarding the evolution of religion and religious 
systems: What are the evolutionary origins of religion’s cognitive components? What 
adaptive functions does religion serve and how did it evolve to serve these 
functions? How are religious concepts transmitted and maintained, and why do 
maladaptive features persist? In their attempt to answer different questions, 
evolutionists from each perspective have developed different theoretical accounts 
and conclusions. Incompatibilities between theories arise when they offer conflicting 
conclusions regarding the same research question. An integrated model would 
incorporate all three sets of questions by incorporating the five complementary 
theories into a comprehensive account. 
Second, each perspective emphasizes a different aspect of religion’s 
evolutionary development. The nonfunctional perspective emphasizes the influence 
of cognitive dispositions, innate mechanisms, and genetics. Functional explanations 
emphasize the power of learning, development, and culture in influencing human 
behaviors. The dysfunctional perspective focuses on how short-timescale cultural 
transmission and environmental change can influence the evolution of cultural 
features. Evolutionary theory as a whole has progressed beyond disputes over 
which component requires more emphasis. In reality, each piece is critical to 
evolutionary explanations. In fact, the evolutionary sciences are currently 
undergoing a paradigm shift, called the “Extended Synthesis,” partially based on the 
transition to more complex models (see Pigliucci, 2009). Recent evidence suggests 
that there are “four, not just one, systems of inheritance that affect the evolution of 
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biological organisms: the standard genetic one, an epigenetic component, a 
behavioral one, and a symbolic one” (Jablonka and Lamb, 2005; Pigliucci, 2009, p. 
223). The “epigenetic component” refers to inherited changes in phenotypes caused 
by mechanisms other than changes to the underlying DNA sequence. It remains 
unclear what role epigenetics plays in the evolution of religious systems. The 
“behavioral” and “symbolic” components, on the other hand, denote imitative 
behavior and symbolic transmission that seem extremely influential in the process. 
According to the ES perspective, scientists should incorporate all four systems of 
inheritance into evolutionary models to effectively explain complex phenomena like 
religion.  
Synthesizing the five strands of evolutionary theorizing about religion would 
take the first step in this direction by integrating non-genetic systems with genetic 
ones. First, byproduct theory evolutionarily explains the genetic inheritance of 
cognitive mechanisms underlying religion. Second, individual-level adaptation theory 
outlines selection pressures that may add design to the byproducts of these 
mechanisms. Third, MLST factors in the rapid behavioral and symbolic inheritance 
within groups that may also functionally design these byproducts at the group-level. 
This occurs when between-group selection pressures outweigh pressures within the 
group due to cultural uniformity and identification with a tradition or institution. 
Fourth, meme theory adds to the model by offering a useful conceptualization of 
how this behavioral and symbolic inheritance might occur. In fact, according to 
Wilson (2007) memes may form the social physiology of the human group organism. 
Meme theory also helps explain how memetic evolution may result in the 
persistence of religion’s maladaptive features. And fifth, anachronism theory 
accounts for another way that the complex inheritance of religious systems can lead 
to maladaptive outcomes. When synthesized, these theories complement one 
another to build a complex model that accounts for non-genetic systems that, 
according to the Extended Synthesis, should be included in evolutionary analyses.  
 An integrated perspective is based on a previously refuted hypothesis that 
we believe merits reexamination: the exaptation or co-opted byproduct4 hypothesis 
of religion. Stephen Jay Gould (1991) first proposed this hypothesis nearly twenty 
years ago. It was, for the most part, rejected seven years later because it did not 
meet certain standards of evidence (Buss, et al., 1998). It now offers a viable 
alternative to purely nonfunctional, functional, and dysfunctional accounts. Buss and 
colleagues faulted Gould’s arguments as failing to adequately specify “(a) the 
original adaptations or byproducts that were co-opted to produce religion; (b) the 
causal mechanism responsible for the co-opting;” and (c) “the manner in which 
                                                
4 An exaptation is a “feature that now enhances fitness, but was not built by natural selection 
for its current role” (Gould, 1991, p. 47). Buss, et al., (1998) make the necessary distinction 
between two types of exaptations: co-opted adaptations and co-opted byproducts. In the 
former, the mechanism being co-opted for a new function was an adaptation and selection is 
required to explain the original adaptation being co-opted (e.g. fish fins, adapted for 
swimming, being exapted for walking on land). In the latter, the mechanism being co-opted 
was not an adaptation but rather an incidental byproduct of an adaptation (e.g. reading, a 
byproduct of many adaptive mechanisms in the brain, being exapted for many functional 
purposes). 
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religion contributes to the solution of an adaptive problem of survival or 
reproduction” (p. 542). Over the past decade, however, evolutionary research and 
theorization has built up evidence where it was previously lacking. Byproduct theory 
helps specify (a) “the original adaptations or byproducts,” while individual-level 
adaptation theory, multi-level selection theory, and memetics help outline (b) “the 
causal mechanism” and (c) religion’s exapted function. Meme and anachronism 
theory also help explain how this exapted function can rapidly change, even 
becoming maladaptive, given memetic evolution and novel environments.  
 A useful analogy helps illustrate the idea of a co-opted byproduct. Religion 
may have developed more like a closet underneath a staircase: a separate system 
with separate functionality, despite its origins in the structure and function of the 
staircase itself. The structure of the staircase incidentally creates a byproduct (the 
space under the stairs) that can be adapted for functional purposes (e.g. a storage 
closet). Essentially, the underlying structure is co-opted to solve problems for which 
it was not initially designed.  Imagine human psychology and all of its functional 
components (i.e. psychological mechanisms, cognitive adaptations, etc.) as the 
staircase. This staircase is built out of many individual boards that form its steps and 
allow humans to solve a variety of cognitive and social problems. Each represents 
one of these functional components which combine to form a functional apparatus: 
the staircase. The triangular space underneath the staircase emerges as an 
unintended creation that lacks design and function. This represents religion as an 
incidental byproduct. 
 However, this incidental creation can be transformed into something 
functional, such as a closet. This closet can serve many purposes and be used by 
individuals and by groups, perhaps an entire family. Similarly, religion can evolve to 
serve the needs of individuals and those of an entire social group, society, or 
civilization. Evolutionarily, the closet endures because the staircase serves adaptive 
functions. Yet closets also serve functions and can be socially and culturally shaped 
and developed. The structural requirements of a particular closet as dictated by the 
architecture of the staircase can also determine how, and within what limits, it 
functions. Thus, the closet is subject to the constraints of its architectural features. 
In religion’s case, these limits represent the constraints established by the human 
cognitive niche. Over time the closet’s function changes based on individual and 
group level pressures, but only within these constraints. If the closet compromises 
the staircase’s integrity, the system collapses. In religion’s case, the demise of 
Shakerism exemplifies this phenomenon. Thus, although initially created as an 
incidental byproduct, the closet develops over time into a structurally constrained, 
socially designed, functional byproduct. Evolutionarily, this is commonly referred to 
as an exaptation or “co-opted byproduct” (Buss, et al., 1998; Gould, 1991). 
Exiting the storage closet and returning to reality, we can tell an analogous 
evolutionary story. Byproduct theory offers a viable explanation for the evolutionary 
origins of the cognitive components of religion. Religious cognition incidentally 
results from the everyday functioning of nonreligious cognitive adaptations and 
interactions among these mechanisms and environments. The human cognitive 
niche predisposes us to form supernatural and religious ideations. Once humans 
generate religious byproducts, these byproducts propagate through systems of 
behavioral imitation and symbolic transmission. Meme theory helps conceptualize 
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these systems. These byproducts can be co-opted for many different individual and 
group-level benefits, including better reproductive opportunities for group members 
and increased group solidarity and success in inter-group conflict. Individual-level 
adaptation and multi-level selection theories help evolutionarily explain this co-
opting process. As societies and environments change on short timescales, 
maladaptive outcomes can result as certain functions become anachronistic and 
detrimental to evolutionary fitness. 
A reevaluation of Jainism can once again help elucidate many of these 
points. Jainism, just like all other religions, is innately a byproduct of functional 
cognitive capacities interacting with each other and environments. However, Jainism 
also displays co-opted functionality and exapted design. For example, Jain 
renouncers publicly display their devotion and transmit this memeplex horizontally to 
potential converts. Different dogmatic prescriptions for Jain laity demonstrate this 
memeplex’s development in the group. Jain rituals appear to promote the fitness of 
individual group members through costly signaling behaviors. They have also 
helped form a unified, tight-knit community in which each devoted member is treated 
like kin. These beneficial outcomes have contributed to the group’s longevity and 
economic success relative to other religious groups in India.  
Thus, a multitude of interrelated cognitive byproducts that make up religious 
systems are co-opted for individual, group, and meme-level functionality through a 
process of multi-level social and cultural selection. Following this logic, we have 
theoretically addressed each of the requirements to explain religion as a co-opted 
byproduct. First, nonfunctional research offers evidence for a wide range of 
cognitive adaptations that interact to create religion. Second, the multi-level social 
and cultural selection of religion works as the causal mechanism responsible for the 
co-opting of the religious byproducts generated by these adaptations. And third, a 
multi-level analysis and complex evolutionary model, which incorporates selective 
pressures at the individual, group, and memetic levels along with non-genetic 
systems of inheritance, demonstrates that religion fulfills a multitude of exapted 
functions.   
Of course, this is just a brief sketch of how the theories might be integrated, 
anchored on the idea of a co-opted byproduct exaptation. The main purpose of the 
illustration is not to offer a full-fledged synthesis, but to suggest the value of 
integration as opposed to denouncing different approaches and promoting one’s 
preferred model on the grounds that it is addressing a set of problems the others 
ignore. With the emergence of the Extended Synthesis in evolutionary theory, 
evolutionists have the tools to broaden their perspective and to synthesize the 
leading theories of religion as well. Energy currently being expended on intramural 
disputes could be focused instead on empirically investigating the multiple 
evolutionary processes at work in the complex and multifaceted phenomenon of 
religion.   
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